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1Abstract
Competitive search was recently introduced in monetary economics by Rocheteau and Wright
(2005). We extend their work by eliminating the restriction that the fees market makers charge
to enter a submarket must be either non-negative or identical for buyers and sellers. Without this
restriction, buyers pay a positive fee to enter the submarket they visit and nothing else when they
meet a seller. Sellers are remunerated by the market makers from the entry fees collected from
the buyers. This trading arrangement allows buyers to perfectly predict their expenses, so the
opportunity cost of holding idle money balances is eliminated.
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Competitive search (price posting with directed search) is an equilibrium concept that introduces
price competition in an environment where trades take place in bilateral matches. This concept
has been widely used in labor economics, and was recently introduced into monetary economics by
Rocheteau and Wright in [4]. This comment to [4] seeks to clarify that competitive search has a
property without counterpart in non-monetary economies. Namely, when money is the medium of
exchange, competitive search tends to make payments predictable to avoid idle money balances.
There have been several formulations of competitive search. In [4], a large number of potential
market makers organize trading centers referred to as submarkets, in which, the market makers
post trading oﬀers specifying the terms at which buyers and sellers must trade. Buyers and sellers
can only ﬁnd a trading partner by entering a submarket, once in there, they randomly match in
pairs. The market makers can charge fees to buyers and sellers to enter their submarket and seek
maximum proﬁts, but competition among market makers drives their proﬁts to zero and leads to
ex-ante bilaterally eﬃcient trading arrangements.1
We extend [4] by eliminating the restriction that the entry fees market makers charge must be
either non-negative or identical for buyers and sellers. Without this restriction, equilibrium trading
arrangements have the following property. As long as there is an opportunity cost of carrying
money and matching is frictional, buyers pay a positive fee to enter the submarket they visit and
nothing else when they meet a seller. Sellers are remunerated by the market makers from the entry
fees collected from the buyers. This trading arrangement allows buyers to perfectly predict their
expenses so that the opportunity cost of holding idle money balances is eliminated.2
1Equilibrium trading oﬀers and market composition maximize the expected surplus of a buyer subject to the
expected surplus of a seller and the constraints imposed by the environment.
2The role of market makers in this model is similar to the role played by banks in [1].
3To support our equilibrium, market makers must be present organizing the trading centers where
buyers and sellers are matched in pairs and play an active role in the transfer of payments from
buyers to sellers. In standard non-monetary economies, the presence of market makers is just an
expositional device. In these economies, one can equivalently assume that submarkets are created
by market makers, or that they are implicitly created by buyers or sellers posting the trading oﬀers
they commit to trade. In contrast, the market makers in our model play a fundamental role by
allowing buyers to carry less money balances,3 which leads to welfare-improving allocations that
otherwise would not be possible.
In summary, competitive search with submarkets organized by unrestricted market makers leads
to the counterfactual prediction that buyers should make a constant payment each period regardless
of the output they consume. Such a trading arrangement is certainly not typical of most purchases
made with money in retail markets. However, we do not view this counterfactual prediction as a
reductio-absurdum attack on using competitive search in monetary economics. Instead, we view it
as a caution that one must be careful in modelling competitive search to generate sensible results.
In particular, the presence of market makers is not an innocuous expositional device and should
be used with great care or avoided entirely. Also, we view our result as a simple extreme case
of a broader tendency in competitive search to make payments predictable to avoid idle money
balances. Even without market makers, this tendency may manifest itself in more realistic ways as
s h o w ni n[ 2 ] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment where buyers
and sellers operate. Section 3 ﬁnds the competitive-search equilibrium that arises if market makers
can charge diﬀerential fees to buyers and sellers. Section 4 compares this equilibrium to the one
characterized by [4] where diﬀerential fees are absent. Section 5 concludes.
3In the absence of market makers, buyers cannot commit to make a payment when they fail to meet a seller. So,
idle money balances are unavoidable.
42 Environment
We use a special case of the environment advanced in [4] which we brieﬂy summarize here. This
environment is a modiﬁe dv e r s i o no ft h ef r a m e w o r ki n[ 3 ] . 4
In this environment, time is discrete, and the horizon is inﬁnite. Each period consists of two
subperiods to be called day and night. There is a single non-durable good which is traded in a
frictionless and centralized market during the day, but it is traded in a decentralized market during
the night. In the day market, everybody can produce and consume the good, but at the night
market only a fraction of the population can produce the good, and the remaining fraction can
consume it. The fraction of the population that can produce at night are called sellers, and the
fraction of the population that can consume at night are called buyers. There is a continuum of
buyers and sellers. The measure of buyers is exogenous and normalized to 1, and the measure of
active sellers is endogenous and denoted nt ≥ 0. Sellers must incur a utility cost k>0e v e r yn i g h t
to enter the market.5
In this environment, there is a role for money to facilitate trade because at night there is a lack
of double coincidence of wants, and all traders are anonymous. Money is an intrinsically useless,
perfectly divisible, and storable asset. The money supply grows at a constant factor γ such that
Mt+1 = γMt,w h e r eMt is the quantity of money per buyer, with the units of money called dollars.
New money is injected via lump-sum transfers to buyers when they are in the centralized market.
The instantaneous utility of a buyer at date t is:
Ub(xt,y t,q t)=v(xt) − yt + u(qt); (1)
4In [3], where trading roles are not known ex-ante, competitive search leads to a gift exchange equilibrium even if
market makers are not present.
5Following [4], the measure of potential sellers is assumed to be suﬃciently large, so that in all equilibria we
consider a fraction of sellers remains inactive at night.
5where xt and yt respectively are quantities consumed and produced during the day, and qt is the
quantity consumed during the night. Likewise, the instantaneous utility of a seller is:
Us(xt,y t,q t)=v(xt) − yt − c(qt); (2)
The lifetime utilities of buyers and sellers are E
P∞
t=0 βtUh (xt,y t,q t),f o rh = b and s, and β is
the one-period discount factor. We assume γ>β . The functions v, u, and c are all continuously
diﬀerentiable and increasing. The functions v and u are concave, while c is convex. Moreover,
v(0) = u(0) = c(0) = c0(0) = 0, and u0(0) = ∞.
During the night, there are some agents called market makers who can open submarkets. To
ﬁnd a trading partner, buyers and sellers must enter one of these submarkets. In submarket j,t h e
market maker charges buyers a fee D
bj
t and sellers a fee D
sj
t . These fees can be negative, in which
case the market maker pays a trader to enter the submarket. Entering a submarket j involves








posted ex-ante by the market maker. These
trading oﬀers specify that if a trading meeting occurs between a buyer and a seller, the seller will
supply q
j
t units of output, and the buyer will pay d
j
t dollars.
Inside each submarket, buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs, and goods can only
be exchanged in these matches. (The market maker cannot transfer goods directly from buyers to
sellers.) Let n
j
t be the ratio of sellers over buyers in submarket j. The probability that a buyer






t). Likewise, the probability a seller meets

































,α(0) = 0,a n dα(∞)=1 . As a result of these restrictions, the probability
that a seller meets a buyers falls with n
j
t. For simplicity, we focus on stationary equilibria where
real allocations are constant over time. The time subscript t is omitted and we shorten t +1to
+1 in what follows. We also drop the superscript j denoting a submarket whenever there is no
possibility of confusion.
62.1 The Behavior of Buyers
This subsection characterizes the optimal behavior of a buyer who plans to visit a submarket where
buyers meet sellers with probability αb. In this submarket, q units of output are exchanged for d
dollars. In addition, to enter the submarket the buyer must pay Db dollars.
A representative buyer that starts the morning with money balances mb
0 faces the following
budget constraint:
xb + mbφ = yb + mb
0φ, mb ≥ 0, (3)
where xb and yb are respectively the consumption and the production of goods during the day, mb
is the amount of money demanded, the price of the good traded during the day is normalized to 1,
and the price of money is φ. The optimal choice of
©
xb,yb,m bª
solves the following maximization
program:
V b(mb
0)= m a x
{xb,yb,mb}














mb − Db + τ+1
´
. (4)
subject to (3) and max(Db+d,Db) ≤ mb. The buyer must carry enough money to pay the entry fee
to the submarket and the direct payment to a seller. The term τ+1 denotes the lump-sum transfer
that all buyers receive from the government the next day.
The quasi-linearity of preferences implies that
xb = x∗, (5)
where x∗ is implicitly deﬁned by the equality v0(x∗)=1 . Also, as in [3], the quasi-linearity implies
that the value function is aﬃne:
V b(mb
0)=¯ vb + mb
0φ; (6)
7where ¯ vb is independent from mb
0. Substituting (3), (5), and (6) into (4), we obtain
V b(mb
0)=v(x∗) − x∗ + β
³

















In a stationary equilibrium,6 the value of money φ declines at the same rate as the quantity of








Since γ>β ,iis strictly positive. Therefore, (7) implies that the buyer should not carry money
balances above the maximum payment to be made, that is mb =m a x ( Db + d,Db,0). Deﬁning
z ≡ βdφ+1,Z b = βDbφ+1, and ˆ mb = βmbφ+1, we have that the utility of a buyer in a stationary
equilibrium satisﬁes:
V b(mb
0)=v(x∗) − x∗ + β
³
¯ vb + τ+1φ+1
´
+ mb
0φ + αb [u(q) − z] − Zb − iˆ mb; (9)
where
ˆ mb =m a x ( Zb + z,Zb,0). (10)
The last three terms in (9) constitute the expected surplus of a buyer for going to the search market
for one night:
Sb = αb [u(q) − z] − Zb − iˆ mb. (11)
The term inside the square brackets is the consumer’s surplus in a trading match, which is the
diﬀerence between the utility from consuming q units of output and the utility value of the payment.
The last two terms are the entry fee into the submarket, and the opportunity cost of carrying money.
Notice that (9) conﬁrms that V b is aﬃne as long as q , d, and Db are independent from mb
0.T h e
next two sections conﬁrm that this independence holds.
6Our arguments should be robust to all equilibria with a positive opportunity cost of holding money.
82.2 The Behavior of Sellers
This subsection characterizes the optimal behavior of a seller who plans to visit a submarket with
an entry fee Ds (possibly negative). In this submarket, the seller meets a buyer with probability
αs and in a trading match the seller exchanges q units of output for d dollars.
A representative seller who starts the morning with money balances ms
0 faces a budget constraint
analogous to (3) replacing the superscript s denoting seller for b:
xs + msφ = ys + ms
0φ, ms ≥ 0. (12)
The optimal choice of {xs,ys,m s} solves the following maximization program:
V s(ms
0)= m a x
{xs,ys,ms}
v(xs) − ys + αs £
−c(q)+βV s
+1 (ms − Ds + d)
¤
+( 1− αs)βV s
+1 (ms − Ds) − k
(13)
subject to (12) and max(Ds − d,Ds) ≤ ms.
The quasi-linearity of preferences implies that xs = x∗, and V s(ms
0)=¯ vs + ms
0φ. Using these
equalities and the budget constraint (12), equation (13) simpliﬁes into:
V s(ms
0)=v(x∗) − x∗ + β
¡





















is larger than one in a stationary equilibrium. Therefore,
(14) implies that the seller should not carry money balances above the maximum possible payment,
that is, ms =m a x ( Ds,Ds − d,0). Deﬁning Zs = βDsφ+1, ˆ ms = βmsφ+1,w eh a v et h a tt h eu t i l i t y
of a seller in a stationary equilibrium satisﬁes
V s(ms
0)=v(x∗) − x∗ + β¯ vs + ms
0φ + αs [z − c(q)] − Zs − iˆ ms − k, (15)
where ˆ ms =m a x ( Zs,Zs − z,0). The last four terms in (15) constitute the expected surplus of the
9seller for being active in the search market for one night:
Ss = αs [z − c(q)] − Zs − iˆ ms − k. (16)
The term inside square brackets is the seller’s surplus in a trading match. The last three terms
are the entry fee into the submarket, the opportunity cost of carrying money to the search market,
and the utility cost of searching for one night. As long as Ss > 0, the seller is strictly better oﬀ by
entering the search market. If Ss < 0, the seller chooses not to enter the search market. At Ss =0 ,
the seller is indiﬀerent between entering the search market or not.
3 Competitive Search with Diﬀerential Fees
This subsection characterizes the competitive-search equilibrium along the same lines as in [4] with
the diﬀerence that we relax the assumption that market makers cannot charge diﬀerential fees to




be the vector that characterizes an active submarket, and I be
the set of indices of the submarkets that are active. A competitive-search equilibrium is a set
©
Sb,Ss,ωjª
j∈I that satisﬁes the following 5 conditions:
1. All buyers attain the same expected surplus Sb in all active submarkets.
2. All sellers attain the same expected surplus Ss in all active submarkets. This expected surplus
must be zero: Ss =0 .
3. In all submarkets, the expected ratio of sellers over buyers is equal to the actual ratio nj.
4. In all submarkets, ωj maximizes the proﬁts of the market maker organizing j, Zbj + njZsj,
taking Sb and Ss as given.
5. The market makers in all active submarkets earn zero proﬁts: Zbj + njZsj =0for all j ∈ I.
10The motivation of these conditions of equilibrium is the following: Since all buyers are ex-
ante homogenous, their freedom to choose the submarket where they search implies that all active
submarkets must provide them with the same expected surplus (condition 1). Similarly, a perfectly
elastic supply of sellers free to enter any one of the active submarkets implies that in equilibrium
the expected surplus of a seller must be zero (condition 2). Rational expectations implies condition
3. The objective of market makers is to maximize proﬁts. Strategically, a potential market maker




created will either be inactive, or the ratio nj will adjust endogenously so that the buyers and sellers
visiting the submarket attain the expected surpluses Sb and Ss. Since there are many potential
market makers and a continuum of buyers and sellers, each market maker takes Sb and Ss as given
(condition 4). Finally, competition among all potential market makers drives equilibrium proﬁts
to zero (condition 5), which does not imply that the fees paid by buyers and sellers are necessarily
zero. With the ability to charge diﬀerential fees, the market maker may impose positive fees on
buyers to ﬁnance transfers to sellers, or vice versa.
To characterize a competitive-search equilibrium, it is convenient to use a dual formulation of
condition 4. Since the proﬁts of the market maker and the expected surpluses of buyers and sellers
are monotonic in Zb and Zs, condition 4 is equivalent to the maximization of Sb as deﬁn e di n( 1 1 )
subject to Ss and the optimized proﬁts attained by the market maker. Consequently, collecting
the equilibrium conditions 1 to 5, the vector ω in an active submarket must solve the following
maximization program (the superscript denoting that the submarket is dropped since all variables
refer to the same submarket):
Sb =m a x
(Zb,Zs,q,z,n)




[z − c(q)] − Zs − iˆ ms = k. (18)
ˆ mb =m a x ( Zb,Zb + z), (19)
ˆ ms =m a x( Zs,Zs − z,0), and (20)
Zb = −Zsn. (21)
In (19), we have dropped the non-negativity constraint on ˆ mb because the other constraints ensure
that it holds. To see this, (18) together with (20) and kn + α(n)c(q) > 0 implies that −nZs +
α(n)z>0. This inequality, combined with (21) and (10), implies ˆ mb > 0. Intuitively, we see that
sellers can only be remunerated if ˆ mb is positive.
The diﬃculty in solving (17) to (21) is to keep track of the many possibilities oﬀered by the
maximum functions in (19) and (20). To deal with this diﬃculty, we establish the following result:
Lemma 1 Let Sb(ω) be a function mapping the set of potential submarkets Ω onto Sb.If ω1 =
(Zb
1,Zs
1,q 1,z 1,n 1) is in Ω and satisﬁes the constraints (18) to (21), then the vector ω2 =( Zb
2,Zs
2,q 1,z 2,n 1)
with z2 =0and Zb
2 = −nZs
2 = kn1 + α(n1)c(q1) also satisﬁes the constraints (18) to (21) and
Sb(Zb
1,Zs
1,q 1,z 1,n 1) ≤ Sb(Zb
2,Zs
2,q 1,z 2,n 1). (22)
The inequality (22) is strict if α(n1) < 1 and z1 > 0,o rα(n1) > 0 and z1 < 0.
Proof: A direct check shows that ω2 satisﬁes (18) to (21) if ω1 does so. Combining (11) with
(18) and (21), we obtain:
Sb(Zb,Zs,q,z,n)=α(n)[u(q) − c(q)] − nk − i
³
ˆ mb + nˆ ms
´
. (23)




2,q 1,0,n 1) − Sb(Zb
1,Zs
1,q 1,z 1,n 1)=i
h
ˆ mb
















1 + α(n1)z1 − kn1 − α(n1)c(q1)] (26)
≥ 0. (27)
Equation (24) follows from (23). Inequality (25) is implied by (19) together with z2 =0 , ˆ ms
1 ≥ 0,
and ˆ ms
2 =0 . Inequality (26) results from (21), the deﬁnition of Zb
2, and α(n1) ∈ [0,1]. Inequality
(26) is strict if α(n1) < 1 and z1 > 0,o rα(n1) > 0 and z1 < 0. Finally, (27) follows from (18) and
ˆ ms
1 ≥ 0¥
Since Lemma 1 applies to all vectors in Ω, including the solutions to program (17) to (21),
all submarkets active in an equilibrium where α(n) ∈ (0,1) must have z =0 . Intuitively, as long
as α(n) ∈ (0,1), using the market maker to transfer money from buyers to sellers eliminates
idle money balances, so that it minimizes the opportunity cost of money holdings. If an active
submarket has α(n)=1 , then the buyer pays Zb +z for sure, and the expected remuneration of a
seller is (Zb + z)/n. Therefore, the breakdown between Zb and z is undetermined but irrelevant.
Using Lemma 1, programs (17) to (21) simplify into
max
(q,n)
α(n)[u(q) − c(q)] − kn− i[α(n)c(q)+kn] (28)











As a necessary condition for n>0, we assume k<u (q∗) − c(q∗),w h e r eq∗ is the solution to
u0(q∗)=c0(q∗).











An increase in inﬂation represents an implicit tax on the goods purchased with money. As a
result, the market responds by cutting both the number of sellers active at night and the output
they oﬀer. Since welfare is an increasing function of both q and n,i n ﬂation implies welfare losses.
Up until now, −Zs has been assumed to be a lump-sum payment from the market maker to the
seller conditional only upon the seller’s entry into the submarket. This is a convenient simpliﬁcation,
but it is not necessary to solve (17) to (21). The payment sellers receive could be randomized or
made conditional on trading with a buyer. As long as the handouts are adjusted so that sellers
receive the same expected payment, they will attain the same expected surplus. Moreover, the
optimal q and n would still be given by (29) and (30). To avoid idle money balances, the amounts
paid by buyers should be predictable, but it is not essential if the payments received by sellers are
predictable or not.
4 Equilibrium without Diﬀerential Fees
This section brieﬂy compares the competitive-search equilibrium in the previous section with the
one characterized in [4] without the possibility of diﬀerential entry fees. If the market maker cannot
distinguish between buyers and sellers, we have that the fees charged to all traders must be the
same: Zb = Zs. This equality combined with the zero-proﬁts constraint (21) implies7
Zb = Zs =0 . (31)
The absence of diﬀerential fees adds the extra constraint (31) to the program (17) to (21) that
7As remarked in [4], (31) also follows from Z
b ≥ 0 and Z
s ≥ 0.








[z − c(q)] = k. (33)
The welfare comparison between the equilibria that result with and without diﬀerential fees is
straightforward. In both cases, the expected surplus of sellers in equilibrium is zero, and market
makers earn zero proﬁts. The expected surplus of buyers is the objective of the two programs we
used to characterize a competitive equilibrium. Since (32) to (33) are equivalent to (17) to (21)
with the added constraint (31), the expected surplus of buyers with diﬀerential fees must be at
least the expected surplus of buyers without them. Moreover, if α(n) < 1 and i>0,t h e nL e m m a
1 implies that buyers are strictly better oﬀ with diﬀerential fees. In this instance, market makers
are not just an expositional device but also play a fundamental role in the economy.



















Comparing (29), (30) with (34) and (35), it is clear that if i =0 , the equilibrium values of q
and n are identical with and without diﬀerential fees, so that the two equilibria coincide at the
Friedman rule. However, if i>0 and α(n) < 1, the quantity traded q is higher with diﬀerential
fees because the LHS of (34) is a decreasing function of q.T h e n u m b e r o f s e l l e r s n cannot be
unambiguously compared across the two equilibria without further assumptions. The welfare cost
of inﬂation without diﬀerential fees exceeds the welfare cost of inﬂa t i o nw i t hd i ﬀerential fees because
15the two equilibria coincide at i =0but, as discussed above, welfare is lower without diﬀerential
fees if i>0.
5C o n c l u s i o n
A positive opportunity cost of holding money implies that the trading arrangements in a competitive-
search equilibrium tend to make payments predictable to reduce the demand for money. By elimi-
nating the restriction in [4] that entry fees must be either non-negative or identical for buyers and
sellers, we show that this tendency leads to the following result. In an equilibrium with frictional
matching, buyers pay only an entry fee to the market maker, so that they know exactly the amount
of money they are going to spend in the search market. This mechanism eliminates the carrying of
idle money balances. The charging of an entry fee is atypical of most purchases made with money.
Hence, this counterfactual result acts as a caution against using market makers for formulating
competitive search in monetary economies.
The tendency towards predictable payments goes well beyond the simple trading arrangement
analyzed in this model. Even if market makers do not exist or cannot charge diﬀerential fees,
predictable payments do reduce the opportunity cost of carrying money balances. The mechanism
used to make payments predictable depends on the instruments available. For example, [2] provides
a model where there are no market makers to charge diﬀerential fees, but buyers still experience
observable idiosyncratic shocks after matching with a seller. In that model, the tendency to make
payments predictable takes the form of cross subsidies across buyer types. If preference shocks are
observable and individual rationality constraints are not binding, buyers pay again a single ﬂat
fee in equilibrium. However, in general the smoothing of the ﬂow of payments is not complete, so
payments increase with the quantities purchased.
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